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Predictive coding posits that neural systems make forward-looking predictions about incoming information.
Neural signals contain information not about the currently perceived stimulus, but about the difference
between the observed and the predicted stimulus. We propose to extend the predictive coding framework
from high-level sensory processing to themore abstract domain of theory ofmind; that is, to inferences about
others’ goals, thoughts, and personalities. We review evidence that, across brain regions, neural responses
to depictions of human behavior, from biological motion to trait descriptions, exhibit a key signature of pre-
dictive coding: reduced activity to predictable stimuli. We discuss how future experiments could distinguish
predictive coding from alternative explanations of this response profile. This framework may provide an
important new window on the neural computations underlying theory of mind.Introduction
Social life depends on developing an understanding of other
people’s behavior: why they do the things they do, and what
they are likely to do next. Critically, though, the externally observ-
able actions are just observable consequences of an unobserv-
able, internal causal structure: the person’s goals and intentions,
beliefs and desires, preferences and personality traits. Thus, a
cornerstone of the human capacity for social cognition is the
ability to reason about these invisible causes. If a person checks
her watch, is she uncertain about the time or bored with the con-
versation? And is she chronically rude or just unusually frazzled?
The ability to reason about these questions is sometimes called
having a ‘‘theory of mind.’’
Remarkably, theory of mind seems to depend on a distinct
and reliable group of brain regions, sometimes called the
‘‘mentalizing network’’ (e.g., Aichhorn et al., 2009; Saxe and
Kanwisher, 2003), which includes regions in human superior
temporal sulcus (STS), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), medial
precuneus (PC), and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). Indeed,
the identity of these regions has been known since the very first
neuroimaging studies were conducted. By 2000, based on four
empirical studies, Frith and Frith concluded that ‘‘Studies in
which volunteers have to make inferences about the mental
states of others activate a number of brain areas, most notable
the medial [pre]frontal cortex [(MPFC)] and temporo-parietal
junction [(TPJ)]’’ (Frith and Frith, 2000). Since then, more than
400 studies of these regions have been published. However,
although there is widespread agreement on where to look for
neural correlates of theory of mind, much less is known about
the neural representations and computations that are imple-
mented in these regions. The problem is exacerbated because
these brain regions, and functions, may be uniquely human
(Saxe, 2006; Santos et al., 2006). Recent evidence suggests
that there is no unique homolog of the TPJ or MPFC (Rushworth
et al., 2013; Mars et al., 2013), making it even harder to directly
investigate the neural responses in these regions.
In the current review, we import a theoretical framework, pre-
dictive coding, from other areas of cognitive neuroscience and
explore its application to theory of mind. There has recently836 Neuron 79, September 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.been increasing interest in the idea of predictive coding as a uni-
fying framework for understanding neural computations across
many domains (e.g., Clark, 2013). In this review, we adapt a
version of the predictive coding framework that has been devel-
oped for mid- and high-level vision. Like vision, theory of mind
can be understood as an inverse problem (Baker et al., 2011;
Baker et al., 2009); the challenge is to use the observable
evidence (in this case human behaviors and states) to infer the
invisible causal structure that gave rise to the evidence (the
goals, thoughts, and personality of the individual; Seo and Lee,
2012). Also like vision, theory of mind is a complex cognitive
process that depends on many different brain regions with likely
distinct computational roles (DiCarlo et al., 2012). We suggest
that a predictive coding framework can be used both to shed
light on existing data about these brain regions, and to suggest
productive new lines of research.
First, we briefly review predictive coding, and sketch a model
we believe can serve as an integrative framework for the neuro-
science of theory of mind. Second, we provide a selective review
of existing neuroimaging studies of theory of mind. Across
different stimuli and designs, with correspondingly different
social information and predictive contexts, we find a classic
signature of a predictive error code: reduced neural response
to more predictable inputs. Third, we discuss how to distinguish
predictive coding from alternative explanations of this response
profile, including differences in attention or processing time.
Based on recent neuroimaging experiments in visual neuro-
science, we suggest strategies for future experiments to test
specific predictions of predictive coding. Finally, we discuss
the implications of predictive coding for our understanding of
the neural basis of theory of mind.
A Predictive Coding Framework
The central idea of ‘‘predictive coding’’ is that (some) neural
responses contain information not about the value of a currently
perceived stimulus, but about the difference between the
stimulus value and the expected value (Fiorillo et al., 2003;
Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2010). This general idea is
most familiar from studies of ‘‘reward prediction error’’ in
Figure 1. A Sensory-Coding-Based Model of Social Predictive
Coding
Predictor neurons (P) code expectations about the identity of incoming input
and pass down the prediction to lower level predictor neurons (green arrows)
and lower level error neurons (blue arrows). Error neurons (E) act as gated
comparators, comparing sensory input from lower levels (red arrows) with the
information from predictor neurons (blue arrows). The difference between the
predicted input and the actual input is passed up to higher level error neurons,
propagating up the processing hierarchy (red arrows). Error neurons also
modulate the response of predictor neurons (purple arrows), likely both by
inhibiting the predictor neurons making incorrect predictions, and enhancing
predictor neurons making correct predictions. When the information that
is being passed up from lower levels matches the information carried by
the predictor neurons, the error neurons’ response to the input is reduced,
‘‘explaining away’’ the predictable input (Rao and Ballard, 1999).
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initially fire when the animal receives a valued reward, like a drop
of juice, and do not respond above baseline to neutral stimuli,
such as aural tones. After the animal has learned that a particular
tone predicts the arrival of a drop of juice two seconds later, the
same neurons fire at the time of the tone. Tellingly, the firing rate
of these neurons no longer rises above baseline at the time the
juice drop actually arrives. Nevertheless, the neurons still
respond to juice. If the tone that typically predicts a single drop
of juice is unexpectedly followed by two drops of juice, the
neurons will increase their firing; and if the tone is unexpectedly
followed by no drops of juice, the neurons decrease their firing
rate below baseline (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Schultz et al., 1997).
These dopaminergic neurons exhibit the simplest and best
known example of a neural ‘‘error’’ code: the rate of firing corre-
sponds to any currently ‘‘new’’ (i.e., previously unpredictable)
information about the value of coming reward, not to the actual
value of any currently perceived stimulus (Bayer and Glimcher,
2005; Nakahara et al., 2004; Tobler et al., 2005).
Predictive coding addresses a general challenge that an ani-
mal faces: developing an accurate model of the expected valueof all incoming inputs. Thus, predictive coding models can be
applied beyond the context of reward prediction to cortical pro-
cessing more generally. In fact, predictive coding was initially
suggested as a model for visual perception (Barlow, 1961; Greg-
ory, 1980; Mumford, 1992), using a visual error code that
preferentially encodes unexpected visual information. The key
benefit of such a code, proponents suggest, is to increase
neural efficiency, by devoting more neural resources to new,
unpredictable information.
By contrast to the single population of reward prediction
error neurons, predictive coding in the massively hierarchical
structure of cortical processing poses a series of challenges.
If sensory neurons respond to prediction errors, there must
exist other neurons to provide the prediction. Thus predictive
coding models require at least two classes of neurons: neurons
that formulate predictions for sensory inputs (‘‘predictor’’ neu-
rons, also called ‘‘representation’’ neurons; Summerfield et al.,
2008; Clark, 2013), and neurons that respond to deviations
from the predictions (‘‘error’’ neurons). Because sensory input
passes through many hierarchically organized levels of pro-
cessing (DiCarlo et al., 2012; Felleman and Van Essen, 1991;
Logothetis and Sheinberg, 1996; Desimone et al., 1984;
Maunsell and Newsome, 1987), a predictive model of sensory
processing requires an account of the interactions between
prediction and error signals, both within a single level and
across levels.
To illustrate the idea, we provide our own sketch of a hierarchi-
cal predictive coding model. This proposal is a hybrid of multiple
approaches (Friston, 2010; Clark, 2013; Wacongne et al., 2012;
deWit et al., 2010; Spratling, 2010), seems to capture the essen-
tial common ideas, and is reasonably consistent with existing
data. The key structural idea is that predictor neurons code
expectations about the identity of incoming sensory input and
pass down the prediction to both lower level predictor neurons
and lower level error neurons. Error neurons act like gated com-
parators: they compare sensory input from lower levels with the
information from predictor neurons. When the information that
is being passed up from lower levels matches the information
carried by the predictor neurons, the error neurons’ response
to the input is reduced. This type of inhibition is the classic sig-
nature of predictive coding, ‘‘explaining away’’ predictable input
(Rao and Ballard, 1999). However, when predictor neurons at a
higher level fail to predict the input (or lack of input), there is a
mismatch between the top-down information from the predictor
neurons and the bottom-up information from lower levels, and
error neurons respond robustly. This error response propagates
up the processing hierarchy. The consequence is a sparse, effi-
cient representation (mostly in predictor neurons) of predictable
input, and a robust, distributed response (mostly in error neu-
rons) to unpredictable input, both coordinated across multiple
levels of the processing hierarchy (Figure 1).
Within a cortical region, population activity reflects amixture of
responses in the predictor neurons (passing information about
predicted inputs down the hierarchy) and the error neurons
(passing information about unpredicted inputs up the hierarchy).
In principle, predictive codingmodels needmake no assumption
about the distribution of these two kinds of neurons within a
population; in practice, aggregate population activity is oftenNeuron 79, September 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 837
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2012; Egner et al., 2010; Keller et al., 2012;Meyer and Sauerland,
2009). The result is that the classic signature of predictive cod-
ing, reduced activity to predictable stimuli, is typically observed
when averaging across large samples of neurons within a region
(Meyer and Olson, 2011; Egner et al., 2010; de Gardelle et al.,
2013). However, (as described in more detail below) signatures
of the predictor neurons can also be observed; for example,
the predictor neurons would likely show increased response
when the input matches their predictions (e.g., de Gardelle
et al., 2013).
Following work in sensory processing (e.g., Wacongne et al.,
2012), in our proposal both error neurons and predictor neurons
convey ‘‘representational’’ information, and both are likely tuned
to specific stimuli or stimulus features. Predictor neurons,
present at each level of the cortical hierarchy, do not code a
‘‘complete’’ representation of the expected stimulus, but only
some features or dimensions of the stimulus, at a relevant level
of processing. Each set of predictor neurons can explain only
those particular features or dimensions of the input, and corre-
spondingly modulates the response in a highly specific subset
of error neurons. Error neurons are similarly distributed
throughout the cortex and respond to specific stimulus features
(Meyer and Olson, 2011; den Ouden et al., 2012), rather than, for
example, a single ‘‘error region’’ signaling the overall amount of
error or degree to which the observed stimulus is unpredicted
(e.g., Hayden et al., 2011). Thus, for example, in the early visual
cortex, predictor neurons code information about the predicted
orientation and contrast at a certain point in the visual field,
and error neurons signal mismatches between the observed
orientation and contrast and the predicted orientation and
contrast. In IT cortex, predictor neurons code information about
object category; error neurons signal mismatches in predicted
and observed object category (den Ouden et al., 2012; Peelen
and Kastner, 2011).
One consequence of this model is that, typically, the effects of
predictions are limited to relatively few levels of the processing
hierarchy. To illustrate, expecting to see John walk in the room
would lead to predictions of biological motion, a body, and a
face (and possibly to specific predictions within each of these
domains), thus reducing error responses in neural populations
that respond at this level of abstraction. However, these predic-
tions often cannot be effectively or specifically translated into
predictions at the level of early visual receptive fields. Thus,
while prediction signals may be passed down the entire cortical
hierarchy (Clark, 2013; Rao andBallard, 1999), inmany cases the
downstream transformation will make the signal too widespread
to be informative. For example, differential responses to pre-
dictable complex images have been observed in monkey IT
(Meyer and Olson, 2011), and in human ventral temporal cortex
(den Ouden et al., 2010; Egner et al., 2010), without correspond-
ing effects in lower visual areas. Only when the environment
supports specific, low-level predictions (on the scale of e.g.,
orientation and contrast at specific points in retinotopy) should
error signals be observed at lower levels of processing (Alink
et al., 2010; e.g., Murray et al., 2002; Weiner et al., 2010).
When there is no relevant prediction available, error neurons
act largely as ‘‘feature detection’’ or ‘‘probabilistic belief accu-838 Neuron 79, September 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.mulation’’ neurons (Drugowitsch and Pouget, 2012). This pattern
highlights a key difference between predictive coding models
developed for sensory versus reward systems (den Ouden
et al., 2012). Reward errors are ‘‘signed’’: the presence of an
unexpected reward and the absence of an expected reward
are signaled by the same neurons changing their firing rates in
opposite directions. By contrast, sensory prediction neurons
are likely ‘‘unsigned’’: firing rates increase in the presence of
unexplained input.
Finally, our approach contrasts with other recent attempts to
integrate social cognitive neuroscience and predictive coding.
Because predictive coding is most familiar from the context of
reward learning, there has been considerable interest in linking
predictive coding to social reward learning (Behrens et al.,
2009; Jones et al., 2011; Fehr and Camerer, 2007). Social reward
learning can mean either using social stimuli (e.g., smiling faces)
as reward, or learning about reward based on observation or
consideration of others’ experiences (Lin et al., 2012; Zhu
et al., 2012; Zaki and Mitchell, 2011; Poore et al., 2012; Jones
et al., 2011; Izuma et al., 2008; Chang and Sanfey, 2013; see
Dunne and O’Doherty, 2013 for a review). Predictive coding
may also be an important mechanism for motor control (i.e.,
anticipating, and explaining away, the consequences of one’s
own motor actions). Therefore some authors have linked motor
predictions to social predictions via the idea of ‘‘mirror neurons,’’
or shared motor representations for one’s own and others’
actions (Brown and Bru¨ne, 2012; Kilner and Frith, 2008; Patel
et al., 2012). The current proposal differs from both of these
previous approaches by starting with a hierarchical predictive
coding framework developed for cortical visual processing and
by focusing on theory of mind, and specifically the attribution
of internal states like goals, beliefs, and personality traits.
This proposal is of course too general, and leaves many
aspects of the model unspecified (some of which we address
below). Nevertheless, the basic features of predictive coding
described here provide an integrative framework for many find-
ings in the social cognitive neuroscience of theory of mind.
The Sources of Predictions
The social environment—the actions and reactions of other
human beings—can be predicted at a range of temporal scales,
from milliseconds (where will she look when the door slams?)
to minutes (when she comes back, where will she search for
her glasses?) to months (will she provide trustworthy testimony
in a court-case?). All of these contexts afford predictions of a
person’s actions in terms of her internal states, but the sources
and timescales of the predictions are different. As we describe
in the next three sections, many experiments find that neural re-
sponses to predictable actions and internal states are reduced,
compared to unpredictable actions and states. This common
pattern can provide telling clues about the different types, and
sources, of predictions. We find that, while all regions show a
higher response to unexpected stimuli, what counts as unex-
pected varies across regions and experiments, suggesting
that, at different levels of processing, neural error responses
are sensitive to distinct sources of social prediction.
To help clarify the sources of social prediction, we first review
three sources of neural predictions typically manipulated in
Figure 2. Three Brain Regions Involved
in Different Aspects of Theory of Mind:
Examples of Individual Regions of Interest
A region in posterior superior temporal sulcus
(STS, green, peak voxel [66, 36, 12]) involved
in action perception (localized using biomo-
tion relative to scrambled biological motion,
Pelphrey et al., 2003); a region in temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ, blue, peak voxel [62, 52,
18]) involved in thinking about beliefs and
desires (localized using stories about mental
states relative to stories about physical events,
Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003), and a region
in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC, red,
peak voxel [2, 56, 4]) involved in thinking about people’s stable preferences and personalities (localized using attribution of traits to self relative to attri-
bution of traits to someone else, Mitchell et al., 2006). All three ROIs localized using single subject data, p < 0.001.
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assumption that the external world is relatively stable, neurons
may predict that sensory stimuli will remain similar over short
timescales. Predictions based on very recent sensory history
can account for increased responses to stimuli that deviate
from very recent experience (Wacongne et al., 2012), and
reduced responses to stimulus repetition (Summerfield et al.,
2008). Predictive coding may therefore offer an account of
widespread findings of repetition suppression in neural popu-
lations (Grill-Spector et al., 2006). Predictive coding error is
consistent with evidence that predictable repetitions elicit
more repetition suppression than unpredictable repetitions
(Todorovic et al., 2011, Todorovic and de Lange, 2012).
Second, predictable sequences of sensory inputs can be
created arbitrarily, through training. For example, Meyer and
Olson (2011) created associations between pairs of images; for
hundreds of training trials, image A was always presented
before image B. After training, the response in IT neurons to
image B was significantly reduced when it followed image A.
This reduction was highly specific: the response remained high
when image B was presented alone, or following some other
image, and there was no reduction in the response to image
A presented after image B. Other experiments show that a
tone can be used as a cue to predict the orientation of an
upcoming grating (Kok et al., 2012a), and either a colored
frame or an auditory tone can predict whether an upcoming
image will be a face or a house (den Ouden et al., 2010; Egner
et al., 2010). The reliability of the cue can be stable over the
experiment (Egner et al., 2010), or can vary continuously across
trials (den Ouden et al., 2010). In all cases, the magnitude of
neural responses tracks with the unpredictability of the
stimulus, given the cue.
Perhaps most interesting, however, is the third source of
predictions: an internal model of the causal structure of the
world that generated the observed input (Clark, 2013; Tenen-
baum et al., 2011). For example, when two visual bars are
presented in alternating positions creating an illusion of motion,
the visual system appears to generate an internal model of a
single object moving smoothly from one position to the other
across the intervening space. As a consequence, the addition
of a third bar presented at the right intervening space and
time is treated as ‘‘predicted,’’ even though that stimulus is
otherwise unpredictable within the context of the experiment
(Alink et al., 2010).In principle, all of three these sources of predictions can be
applied to social prediction and human actions. In practice,
most of the experiments on theory of mind depend on pre-
dictions based on prior expectations and an internal model of
human behavior (though we do find some evidence of predic-
tions based on temporal proximity). Based on the patterns of
findings, we argue that these internal models must be quite
abstract, and include expectations that actions will be rational
and efficient, and consistent with, for example, the individual’s
beliefs, personality traits, and social norms.
To reduce the complexity of this literature review, we focus
here on three examples of neural responses to actions at three
conceptual levels: responses to biological motion and goal-
directed action in the superior temporal sulcus (STS), to other
people’s beliefs and desires in the temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ), and to people’s stable personality traits in the medial pre-
frontal cortex (MPFC) (Figure 2). We find that, across all three
regions, with respect to the region’s preference and level of
abstraction, expected stimuli systematically elicit lower activa-
tion than unexpected stimuli.
Predicting Goal-Directed Action
The most immediate dimension of the social environment is the
visibly observable movements of other people’s bodies (e.g.,
grasping an item, running away) and faces (e.g., gaze shifts,
emotional expressions). Brain regions in the superior temporal
sulcus (STS) are implicated in many aspects of social action
perception, showing robust responses to face and body action
in both humans (Jellema et al., 2000; Puce et al., 1998; Bonda
et al., 1996; Allison et al., 2002) and monkeys (Perrett et al.,
1985; Jellema and Perrett, 2003b; Jellema and Perrett,
2003a). Patients with lesions to the STS have difficulty recog-
nizing actions (Battelli et al., 2003; Pavlova et al., 2003), an
effect that is reproduced by creating reversible ‘‘lesions’’ in
the STS through repetitive TMS (Grossman et al., 2005).
Consistent with a prediction error code, STS response to
observed actions is reduced when the observed action can
be predicted, and enhanced when the observed action is less
predictable. These predictions appear to arise from a variety
of sources, ranging from experimental statistics, to constraints
on biological motion, to assumption about rational action, sug-
gesting that rather than representing low-level sensory-based
statistics, this region represents (and makes predictions about)
coherent, rational actions.Neuron 79, September 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 839
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to the recent history of the experiment and is reduced by repeti-
tion of a stimulus relevant to human action perception. If two
successive images of faces have the same gaze direction (i.e.,
both gazing right) or the same facial expression (e.g., fearful),
the STS response is reduced compared both to a non-repeated
presentation and to a repeated presentation of an irrelevant
stimulus, such as a house or object (Calder et al., 2007, Ishai
et al., 2004, Furl et al., 2007). Similarly, presenting the same
action twice in row, from different viewing angles, positions,
sizes, and actors leads to reduced STS response relative to a
different action (Grossman et al., 2010; Kable and Chatterjee,
2006).
Human action can also be predicted based on internal models
at many levels of abstraction, from biomechanics to a principle
of rational action. The most basic (and most temporally fine-
grained) predictions are constrained by the structure of bones
and joints and the forces exerted by muscles. Observers
can thus predict the spatiotemporal trajectory of human move-
ments, especially for ballistic motions (Blake and Shiffrar,
2007). Human movements that violate these biomechanical
predictions (for example, a finger bending sideways) elicit a
higher response than more predictable movements in the STS
and related areas (e.g., Costantini et al., 2005). Watching a
human-like figure make robot-like, mechanical movements
elicits more activity than either a human-like figure making
human-like movements or a robot making mechanical move-
ments (Saygin et al., 2012).
Even when they do not violate biomechanical laws, human
actions have a typical spatial and temporal structure. Thus, if a
person is walking rapidly across the room, we predict that they
will continue in the same trajectory, even if they are temporarily
occluded. The posterior STS responds more when the person
reappears later than expected than when the person emerges
at the predicted time; when the person is replaced with a
passively gliding object, there is no effect of the time lag (Saxe
et al., 2004).
In addition to intrinsic aspects of the action, observers expect
others’ actions to be temporally and spatially contingent on the
structure of the environment. If a bright object flashes near a
woman’s head, she is very likely to immediately shift her gaze
toward the object. Seeing the woman immediately shift her
gaze away from the bright object elicits a higher response in
the STS than the predicted gaze shift toward the object (Pelphrey
et al., 2003; Pelphrey and Vander Wyk, 2011). This difference is
reduced if the woman first waits a few seconds before shifting
her gaze, breaking the perception that that flash caused the
gaze shift. Similar effects are observed in infants as young as
9 months, using EEG (Senju et al., 2006). In a more extreme
mismatch between behavior and environment, watching an
agent twisting empty space next to a gear drives a stronger
STS response than the agent twisting the gear (Pelphrey et al.,
2004).
Finally, the STS internal model of human behavior includes
something like a principle of rational action: the expectation
that people will tend to choose themost efficient available action
to achieve their goal. The same action may therefore be pre-
dicted, or unpredicted, depending on the individual’s goals840 Neuron 79, September 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.and the environmental constraints (Gergely and Csibra, 2003).
Correspondingly, the STS response is higher when the same
biomechanical action is unpredicted either because it is ineffi-
cient, or because it is not a means to achieve the individual’s
goal.
For example, action efficiency can bemanipulated by having a
person take a short or long path to the same goal (Csibra and
Gergely, 2007), e.g., reaching for a ball efficiently by arching
her arm just enough to avoid a barrier, or inefficiently by arching
her arm far above the barrier. Across differences in barrier height
and arm trajectory, activity in a region of the MTG/STS is corre-
lated with the perceived inefficiency of the action (Jastorff et al.,
2011). In a related experiment, observers watch someone
performing an unusual action, e.g., a girl pressing an elevator
button with her knee. The context renders her action more or
less efficient: either her hands are empty, she is carrying a single
book, or her arms are completely occupied with a large stack
of books. Activity in STS is highest when the action appears least
efficient, and lowest when the action appears most efficient
(Brass et al., 2007). The STS also respondsmore to failed actions
(e.g., failing to drop a ring onto a peg), an extreme form of
inefficiency, than to successful ones (getting the ring onto the
peg, Shultz et al., 2011). Predictions for efficient action can
even be completely removed from the familiar biomechanics of
human body parts: the same inefficient action (going around
a non-existent barrier) elicits stronger responses in STS than
the efficient version of the same action, when executed by a
‘‘worm’’ (a string of moving dots, Deen and Saxe, 2012).
In other experiments, the STS shows enhanced responses to
actions that are unpredicted given the individual’s specific goals,
even if the action is not inherently inefficient or irrational. For
example, an individual who likes (and smiles at) a mug and
dislikes (and frowns at) a teddy bear can be predicted to reach
for the mug and not the bear. The goal-inconsistent action
(reaching for the mug) elicits a higher response in the STS
(Vander Wyk et al., 2009). Similarly, when two people are coop-
erating on a joint action, the STS shows increased responses
when one person fails to follow the other’s instructions: e.g.,
when asked to select one specific object (e.g., a red ball), the
actor takes the other object (e.g., the white ball; Shibata et al.,
2011; see also Bortoletto et al., 2011).
In sum, observers expect human movements to reflect
actions, which are sensitive to the environment and efficient
means to achieve the individual’s goals. These expectations
can generate predictions for sequences of movements on the
timescale of seconds. All of these sources of predictions can
modulate the neural response in the STS, which is reduced
when the stimulus fits the prediction.
Predicting Beliefs and Desires
Moving from the scale of seconds to the scale of minutes, the
more general version of the principle of rational action is that
people will act efficiently to achieve their desires, given their
beliefs (Baker et al., 2011). Unlike specific motor intentions,
beliefs and desires last from minutes (e.g., the belief that your
keys are in your purse) to years (e.g., the desire to become a
neurosurgeon). These beliefs and desires can be used to predict
aspects of a person’s actions, emotions, and other mental
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from those of the observer (Wellman et al., 2001; Wimmer and
Perner, 1983). Among other regions, a brain region posterior to
the superior temporal sulcus, in the temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ), shows a robust responses while thinking about an individ-
ual’s beliefs and desires (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Young and
Saxe, 2009a; Aichhorn et al., 2009; Perner et al., 2006). If the TPJ
includes a prediction error code, it should respondmore strongly
to beliefs and desires that are unexpected, given the context.
Indeed, there is evidence that the TPJ response is reduced
when a person’s beliefs and desires are predictable (though
note that the results reviewed in this section were generally not
interpreted in terms of prediction error coding by the original
authors). In all of these experiments, the source of prediction is
not recent experimental history or trained associations, but
rather a high level generative model of human thoughts and
behaviors.
One source of predictions about a person’s beliefs and desires
is their actions (Patel et al., 2012). Observers expect other people
to be self-consistent and coherent (e.g., Hamilton and Sherman,
1996). This sensitivity to inconsistencies in belief and action is
reflected in the TPJ. For example, in one group of studies, partic-
ipants read about an act of violent harm or murder. Under the
assumption that people usually act in accordance with their
beliefs (Malle, 1999), the prediction is that the perpetrator in-
tended the harm; most assaults and murders are not accidental.
Next, the participants read about the perpetrator’s actual
beliefs and desires. Responses in the right TPJ are higher for
‘‘unpredicted’’ innocent or benevolent intentions that exculpate
the harm (e.g., she believed the poison was sugar; he only
wanted to end the patient’s misery from an incurable disease)
compared to the ‘‘predicted’’ intention (to kill the person; Buck-
holtz et al., 2008; Koster-Hale et al., 2013; Yamada et al., 2012;
Young and Saxe, 2009b).
Not all actions imply the corresponding intention, however: for
example, violation of social norms (e.g., spitting out a friend’s
cooking back on your plate) are more likely to be committed
accidentally than intentionally. Consistent with a prediction error
code, the TPJ response is higher for violations of norms
performed intentionally (‘‘because you hated the food’’) versus
unintentionally (‘‘because you choked’’; Berthoz et al., 2002).
In addition to these general principles, an individual’s beliefs
and desires can sometimes be predicted based on other infor-
mation you have about his or her specific group membership
and social background. For example, Saxe and Wexler (2005)
introduce characters with different social backgrounds, ranging
from the mundane (e.g., New Jersey) to the exotic (e.g., a poly-
amorous cult). Participants then read about that character’s
beliefs and desires (e.g., a husband who believed it would be
either fun or awful if his wife had an affair). The response in right
TPJ is reduced for the belief that was predictable, given the
character’s social background: the person from New Jersey
thinking his wife having an affair would be awful, and the person
from the polyamorous cult thinking his wife having an affair
would be fun. Similarly, when reading about a political partisan,
political beliefs that are unexpected, given the individual’s affili-
ation (e.g., a Republican wanting liberal Supreme Court judges)
elicits a higher response in right TPJ (Cloutier et al., 2011).On the other hand, the general plausibility of a belief, in the
absence of specific background information about the individ-
ual, does not seem to be sufficient to generate a prediction
(or a prediction error) in the right TPJ. Without specific back-
ground information about the believer, there is no difference
in the right TPJ response to absurd versus commonsense
beliefs (e.g., ‘‘If the eggs are dropped on the table, Will thinks
they’ll bounce / break,’’ (Young et al., 2010), although the partic-
ipants themselves rated the absurd beliefs significantly more
‘‘unexpected.’’ A possible interpretation of these results is that
the internal model of the RTPJ predicts another person’s beliefs
based on expectations of a coherent individual mind, using
information about that individual’s specific actions and history,
but not based on expectation that others will share one’s own
beliefs (see below for a contrast with MPFC) or common
knowledge. However, since these are null results, they should
be interpreted with caution.
In sum, the response in the TPJ to other people’s beliefs and
desires can be modulated by how predictable those beliefs
and desires are, relative to the current environment, the indi-
vidual’s actions, broader social norms, and the individual’s
specific social background.
Predicting Preferences and Personalities
At even longer timescales, successful prediction of the social
environment depends on building distinct models of each of
the individual humans who compose one’s social group. While
some general rules, like the principle of rational action, apply to
all people, predicting a specific person’s action often depends
on knowing the history and traits of that individual. Brain
regions on the medial surface of cortex, in both medial prefrontal
(MPFC) and medial parietal (PC) cortex, show robust responses
while thinking about people’s stable personalities and prefer-
ences (Mitchell et al., 2006; Schiller et al., 2009; Cloutier et al.,
2011). Consistent with a predictive error code, these responses
are reduced when new information about a person can be better
predicted. Again these predictions appear to be derived from
relatively high level expectations that people’s traits will be
consistent across time and contexts, rather than from local
experimental statistics.
Prior knowledge of a person can be acquired through direct
interaction. First person experience of another person’s traits
(e.g., trust-worthiness, reliability), can be manipulated when
participants play a series of simple ‘‘games’’ with one or a few
other players. By gradually changing the other players’ behav-
iors, it is possible to create parametric ‘‘prediction errors.’’ In
one experiment, for example, the other player provided ‘‘advice’’
to the participant; this advice shifted over the experiments, so
that it was reliable in some phases, and unreliable in others.
The response in MPFC tracks with trial-by-trial error in expecta-
tions about the informant’s reliability (Behrens et al., 2008).
Expectations about other people’s traits can also be based
on verbal reports and descriptions. For example, the initial
behaviors of a (fictional) stranger can create an impression of a
certain kind of personality (e.g., ‘‘Tolvan gave her brother a
compliment’’). The MPFC response is enhanced when later ac-
tions by the same person are inconsistent with (i.e., unpredicted
by) this trait (e.g., ‘‘Tolvan gave her sister a slap’’) compared toNeuron 79, September 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 841
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Ma et al., 2012; Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2012).
When specific information about a person’s reputation or traits
is unavailable, we may predict others’ preferences by assuming
that they will share our own preferences (Krueger and Clement,
1994; Ross et al., 1977). In one series of studies (Tamir and
Mitchell, 2010), participants judged the likely preferences of
strangers (e.g., is this person likely to ‘‘fear speaking in public’’
or ‘‘enjoy winter sports’’?) about whom they had almost
no background information. Under those circumstances, the
response of the MPFC was predicted by the discrepancy
between the attributions to the target and the participant’s own
preference for the same items: the more another person was
perceived as different from the self, for a specific item, the larger
the response in MPFC.
In all, human observers appear to formulate predictions for
other people’s movements, actions, beliefs, preferences, and
behaviors, based on relatively abstract internal models of
people’s bodies, minds, and personalities. These predictions
are reflected in multiple brain regions, including STS, TPJ, and
MPFC, where responses to more predictable inputs are
reduced, and to less predictable inputs are enhanced.
Consistent with our general proposal for prediction error cod-
ing, reduced responses to predicted stimuli in these experiments
are typically restricted to relatively few brain regions, and by
implication, to relatively few levels of the processing hierarchy.
Beliefs or actions that are unpredicted, based on high level
expectations, do not elicit enhanced responses at every level
of stimulus processing (e.g., early visual cortex, word form areas,
etc). Nor are prediction errors signaled by a single centralized
domain general ‘‘error detector.’’ Instead, relatively domain-
and content-specific predictions appear to influence just the
error response at the relevant level of abstraction.
Beyond Error
In sum, human thoughts and actions can be rendered unex-
pected in many ways, and across many such variations a com-
mon pattern emerges: brain regions that respond to these
stimuli also show enhanced responses to ‘‘unexpected’’ inputs.
This profile is the classic signature of error neurons, and there-
fore consistent with a predictive coding model of action under-
standing.
While consistent with predictive coding, however, these re-
sults provide only weak evidence in favor of predictive coding.
Increased responses to unexpected stimuli can be explained
by many different mechanisms, including increased ‘‘effort’’
required, increased attention, or longer evidence accumulation
under uncertainty. The predictive coding framework will there-
fore be most useful if it can make more specific predictions
and suggest new experiments.
(1) Distinguishing Prediction from Attention
A salient alternative explanation for enhanced responses to
unpredicted stimuli relies on attention. Unexpected stimuli may
garner more attention, and increased attention can lead to
more processing and higher activation (e.g., Bradley et al.,
2003; Lane et al., 1999). Similarly, increased processing effort
or longer processing time can predict higher activation (e.g.,
Cohen et al., 1997). Thus, higher activation to unexpected stimuli842 Neuron 79, September 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.could reflect greater attention or longer processing, rather than
prediction coding errors. However, relative to these accounts,
predictive coding has a distinctive signature.
By hypothesis, predictions codes are more precise, more
computationally efficient, and less noisy than error codes
(Friston, 2005; Jehee and Ballard, 2009; Rao and Ballard,
1999; Spratling, 2008). As a result, in a predictive coding model,
better speed and accuracy of perception are associated with
reduced overall neural responses to predicted stimuli (Kok
et al., 2012a; den Ouden et al., 2009). By contrast, attention
may cause better speed and accuracy of performance by
increasing overall neural responses to attended stimuli (Feldman
and Friston, 2010; Friston, 2010; Herrmann et al., 2010; Hillyard
et al., 1998; Kok et al., 2012b; Martinez-Trujillo and Treue, 2004;
Reynolds and Heeger, 2009; Treue and Martı´nez-Trujillo, 1999).
That is, whereas attention may increase gain in neural responses
to the attended stimulus, predictions improve perception by
decreasing noise (or increasing sparseness) in neural responses
to the predicted stimulus.
If the neural responses described in the previous section
reflect prediction error, reduced neural responses should be
accompanied by improvements in behavioral performance: peo-
ple should make judgments more quickly, with less error, and
with more sensitivity to expected stimuli. Indeed, behavioral ev-
idence suggests that observers make faster and more accurate
judgments about people who behave as expected in social con-
texts. After watching two people engage in part of a cooperative
action or conversation, participants are faster andmore accurate
when both agents are behaving as expected (e.g., responding
aggressively or cooperatively, responding communicatively or
non-communicatively, or right away, instead of too early or
late; Manera et al., 2011; Neri et al., 2006; Graf et al., 2007).
Important next questions will be to look for these signatures in
other aspects of social cognition, such as goal inference or belief
attribution.
An interesting extension of this idea is the proposal that the
sparser prediction signal should also be easier to decode from
a neural population than the more distributed error signal, within
a single region and task (Kok et al., 2012a; Sapountzis et al.,
2010). In an elegant study, Kok et al., (2012a) asked participants
to make fine perceptual discriminations between oriented grat-
ings. They hypothesized that when the orientation of the gratings
was accurately predicted by a cue, the representation of the
grating would be largely in the sparser predictor neurons,
whereas when the orientation was not accurately predicted
(i.e., on the relatively rare invalidly cued trials), then the represen-
tation of the orientation would be largely in the more distributed
error neurons. Three predictions of their model were confirmed in
the responses of early visual cortex. First, the overall response to
the gratings was lower when the orientation was predicted than
when it was unpredicted (the classic pattern of ‘‘explaining
away’’ the error signal). Second, behavioral discriminations on
the gratings were more accurate when the orientation was
predicted than when it was unpredicted, consistent with the
hypothesis of a more efficient code. Third, and critically, the
orientation of the gratings could be more easily decoded
from the spatial pattern of neural responses in early visual
cortex when the orientation was predicted than when it was
Figure 3. Predicted Stimuli Elicit Reduced Activity with Sharpened Representations
Kok et al. (2012a) report that an accurate prediction led to reduced response amplitude in early visual cortex, but also simultaneously to an ‘‘improved’’ stimulus
representation, as measured by multi-voxel pattern analysis. Consistent with this suggestion, we find that in the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ; right box)
the response amplitude to a predicted belief was lower, but the spatial pattern associated with that belief category was more reliable. Left: a sample stimulus.
All stories described first a harmful action, and then the agent’s belief. The ‘‘predicted’’ belief (solid arrow) was consistent with the action (i.e., making the act
an intentional harm). The ‘‘unpredicted’’ belief (dotted arrow) was inconsistent and rendered the harm an accident. Middle: The amplitude of response in the
TPJ was lower for the intentional than accidental condition. Right: The spatial pattern of response in the TPJ was most robust and reliable across trials for
intentional harms, and somewhat less reliable for accidental harms. Data from Koster-Hale et al. (2013).
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signal is spatially sparser than the error signal. Finally, Kok
et al., (2012a) distinguished the effects of prediction from effects
of attention, by manipulating the participants’ task. Directing
attention to the gratings’ orientation (versus contrast) improved
decoding of orientation in V1, but the effects of attending to
orientation, and of seeing the unpredicted orientation, were
independent and additive.
A corresponding hypothesis should be easy to test with
respect to the neural representation of human behaviors,
thoughts and personalities. The lower responses to expected
stimuli should be accompanied by better decoding of relevant
stimulus dimensions. Indeed, our own results from the TPJ are
consistent with this hypothesis. As described above, when
reading about harmful actions (e.g., putting poison powder in
someone’s coffee), the TPJ response is higher to ‘‘unpredicted’’
innocent beliefs (e.g., that the powder was sugar) than to ‘‘pre-
dicted’’ consistent beliefs (e.g., that the powder was poison;
Young and Saxe, 2009b). We also found that using spatial
pattern analysis in the TPJ, we could decode the difference
between innocent and guilty beliefs (Koster-Hale et al., 2013).
Based on Kok et al., (2012a), a further prediction is that the
decoding should be driven by a sparser and more efficient
response to the predicted category; and indeed, re-analysis of
our data suggests that the guilty beliefs elicit a more distinctive
(i.e., more correlated across trials) spatial pattern than the
‘‘unpredicted’’ innocent beliefs (Figure 3).
Interestingly, the benefits of an accurate prediction may be
quite specific to the aspects of the stimulus that are accurately
predicted. As we suggest earlier, most predictions are limited
to a particular level of abstraction; given a high-level prediction,
the probability of lower-level features appearing will be too
widely distributed to be informative. As a result, accurate pre-
dictions may improve behavioral performance (and neural
decoding) at the representational level of the prediction (e.g.,
which object a person wanted) but fail to improve, or evendegrade, these measures for lower-level features (e.g., where
in space someone looked; He et al., 2012).
(2) Finding the Prediction Signal
An important direction for future research will be to focus on
signatures of the predictor neurons, in addition to the error
neurons. At least four different strategies may help to identify
prediction signals, and distinguish them from the often more
dominant error signals.
First, unlike error neurons, predictor neurons should show
robust activity when the stimulus fits prior predictions. Consis-
tent with this suggestion, a recent study found that although
the majority of voxels in the fusiform face area (FFA, Kanwisher
et al., 1997; Kanwisher, 2010) was suppressed for a repeated
face, a subset of voxels reliably showed the reverse pattern
(de Gardelle et al., 2013), termed repetition enhancement (see
also Turk-Browne et al., 2006; Mu¨ller et al., 2013). Intriguingly,
these two populations of voxels also showed different patterns
of functional connectivity. It will be intriguing to test whether
the STS, TPJ, PC, or MPFC similarly contain subsets of voxels
with enhanced responses to predicted actions or beliefs, and
whether these voxels have distinctive patterns of functional con-
nectivity with other regions, especially because unlike face pro-
cessing, the direction of information flow among regions
involved in theory of mind is largely unknown.
Second, because both predictor neurons and error neurons
may have preferred stimuli (or stimulus features), it may be
possible to identify the content of the prediction independent
from the response to the subsequent stimulus. For example,
the response of the FFA seems to increase when a face stimulus
is predicted, as well as (and partially independent from) when a
face stimulus is observed (den Ouden et al., 2010; Egner et al.,
2010). Note though that neither of the existing studies could
fully independently identify the response to predicting a face,
because in both cases, the probability of a face was exactly
reciprocal to the probability of the only other possible stimulus,
a house. By including a third category of stimulus, or a thirdNeuron 79, September 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 843
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the two cues, it should be possible to independently measure
category-specific responses to the prediction of a category,
versus the response to that category when observed.
Third, and relatedly, predictor neurons can signal the ex-
pectation of a stimulus that never occurs. In some cases, the
absence of an expected stimulus should generate error activity
(den Ouden et al., 2010; Todorovic et al., 2011; Wacongne
et al., 2012). For example, the activity pattern in IT generated
by the surprising absence of an object contains information
about the identity of the absent stimulus (Peelen and Kastner,
2011). Unlike the ‘‘signed’’ (i.e., below baseline) error response
in reward systems, sensory neurons thus seem to show an
increased response to an unexpectedly absent stimulus (though
note that there is some disagreement as towhether this activity is
driven only by the prediction signal before the stimulus is ex-
pected to appear, or by a combination of the prediction signal
with a subsequent error signal when the stimulus fails to appear,
e.g., den Ouden et al., 2010).
Fourth, the prediction and the error signals could be separable
in time. Specifically, under some circumstances, prediction
signals can begin before the stimulus, whereas error signals
are typically triggered by the stimulus itself (e.g., Hesselmann
et al., 2010). The low temporal resolution of fMRI may make it
hard to test this hypothesis directly. However one pattern of
results is consistent with the idea that the STS contains pre-
dictions of upcoming biological motion: still photographs of a
person in mid-motion (such as a discus thrower in the middle
of throwing a disc) elicited more activity in the STS than images
that do not imply or predict motion (the same discus thrower at
rest; Kourtzi and Kanwisher, 2000; Senior et al., 2000).
Fifth, error responses in a single region may be influenced by
predictions from different sources, and these different sources
may be spatially separable. For example, FFA shows repetition
suppression for both repetition of one identical face image
(plausibly a very low-level prediction) and for repetition of a
face across different sizes (requiring a higher-level prediction).
These error signals were related to different patterns of func-
tional connectivity between FFA and lower level regions (Ewbank
et al., 2013). By analogy, there may be different patterns of
functional correlations related to different sources of prediction
for human actions. In one experiment, for example, the STS
response was enhanced for actions that were unpredicted for
two different reasons: reaching for empty space next to a target
(which is an inefficient or failed action), or reaching for a previ-
ously nonpreferred object (which is unpredicted relative to an
inferred goal; Carter et al., 2011; see also Bubic et al., 2009). It
would be interesting to test whether these two kinds of errors
are associated with spatially distinct sources of functional con-
nectivity to the STS.
(3) Using Predictive Coding to Test the Neural
Computations Underlying Theory of Mind
The framework of predictive coding offers a new opportunity to
study the neural representations of others’ actions and thoughts,
using new experimental designs. The necessary logic has been
developed in repetition suppression experiments (Grill-Spector
et al., 2006). Complex stimuli elicit responses in many different
brain regions simultaneously, making it hard to dissociate the844 Neuron 79, September 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.representational and computational contributions of different
brain regions. Consequently, in higher level vision, repetition
suppression has been used to differentiate the stimulus dimen-
sions or features represented in multiple co-activated regions.
For example, although both the FFA and the STS face area
show repetition suppression when the identity of a face is
repeated, only a more anterior STS region shows a reduced
response when the emotional expression is repeated across
different faces (Winston et al., 2004).
Looking for prediction error offers a generalized, and more
flexible, version of repetition suppression studies; critically, it
only requires that a stimulus be surprising along some dimen-
sion, without having to repeat the stimulus. This flexibility is
particularly advantageous for studies using naturalistic or social
stimuli, which can be hard to repeat without also invoking repe-
tition of a number of confounding, but unrelated representa-
tions—for example, words, syntactic structure, or faces. Exact
repetitions of complex stimuli can be unnatural or pragmatically
odd, which may especially limit the ability to study repetition
suppression in young or special populations. By contrast, the
distribution of observed error signals could reveal both which
neural populations or regions are coding the relevant dimensions
and features, and what the sources of predictions are.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this framework may
enrich theorizing about neuroimaging results in social cognitive
neuroscience. One of the key challenges facing social cognitive
neuroscience is that the richness of the data often surpasses the
precision of the theories. This proves to be a problem both for
interpreting the data—inverse inferences are very rarely well-
constrained enough to be compelling, despite their role in theory
building—and for designing new hypotheses and experiments.
Increased response in a brain region has been argued to indicate
both that the stimulus carries many relevant features to a region
and that the stimulus was harder to process or a less good
‘‘fit’’ to the region; this problem is exacerbated when trying to
interpret different neural patterns across groups (i.e., special
populations). If we can begin to break down (a) what kinds of
predictions a region makes, (b) what kind of information directs
those predictions, and (c) what constitutes an error, it may be
possible to formulate much more specific hypotheses about
the computations, and information flow, that underlie human
theory of mind.
In sum, we find a predictive coding approach to theory of
mind promising. There is extensive evidence of a key signature
of predictive coding, in fMRI studies of theory of mind: reduced
responses to expected stimuli. Existing data also provide hints of
other, more distinctive signatures of predictive coding. Future
experiments designed to more directly test the predictions and
errors represented in different brain regions may provide an
important new window on the neural computations underlying
theory of mind.
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